The discussion of resistance, representation, and voices echoed in my mind today as I began to read Donna Haraway (2008)'s When Species Meet and the articles included in the 2010 special issue in Cultural Anthropology (Volume 25, Issue 4) on multispecies ethnography. Both of these texts consider the implications of moving non-humans from the margins of inquiry (as landscape, food, symbols, etc.) to the foreground as agents that live (and not merely exist - pace Giorgio Agamben [1998]'s distinction between zoe or "bare life" [that which is killable] and bios or biographical and political life) alongside and "become with" (Haraway 2008:244) humans. Particularly relevant for our discussion is the article in the Cultural Anthropology collection by S. Eben Kirksey and Stefan Helmreich (2010:553) that grapples with the question, "How can or should or do anthropologists speak with and for nonhuman others?" They suggest that rather than simply ask, "Can the non-human speak?" (pace Spivak 1988), there needs to be a reflexive engagement with how boundaries between species are increasingly blurred and entangled (for example, in transgenic organisms such as OncoMouse, a mouse whose genome has been modified to include human breast cancer genes [Haraway 1997]) in a way that avoids the reification of human exceptionalism and anthropomorphism (554-556).
This question is also dealt with in debates in science studies about the agency (despite a lack of intentionality) of non-humans upon the practices of humans (particularly as developed in actor-network theory and its critiques - for example, Bruno Latour [1994]'s "On Technical Mediation," Michel Callon [1986]'s "Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay," John Law [1986]'s "On the Methods of Long-Distance Control: Vessels, Navigation, and the Portuguese Route to India," and Andrew Pickering [1993]'s "The Mangle of Practice: Agency and Emergence in the Sociology of Science").
Tuesday, March 29, 2011
Wednesday, March 9, 2011
Images of Imperialism
Our readings and discussion about Imperialism in the Philippines got me to go back into my files from 2004 and resurrect a paper I wrote about political cartoons during the Philippine-American War--in particular, how these images and political cartoons adapted as the war went on. I was able to find a few of the images, which come from the left-leaning Life and the right-leaning Judge, show that American attitudes towards colonialism were by no means uniform, even during this first surge of American imperialism. I reproduce here the first paragraph of my essay:
At the end of the 19th century, the U.S. made its bid to become one of the great powers of the world. Amid growing tensions between the pro- and anti-imperialist forces, cartoonists for weekly journals began to take sides, creating images designed to influence public opinion. Founded in 1881, The Judge had become an organ for Republican pro-imperialist propaganda under William Arkell’s leadership.[1] Anti-imperialists found support in Life, which, despite its more social focus, took a strong stand on the question of Philippine annexation and on the morality of the subsequent war.[2] Before the outbreak of the Philippine-American War, The Judge portrayed Filipinos as needing the benevolent protection of the U.S. and rejoicing in their new liberty. Meanwhile, Life printed cartoons emphasizing the hypocrisy of the supposedly humanitarian motives for invading Cuba and the Philippines. Despite their differing stances, however, they both portrayed the Philippines as an attractive feminine identity, and used similar visual progressions to predict the effect of U.S. expansion. However, in the months and years following the outbreak of hostilities, The Judge turned sharply away from any sympathetic conception of the natives, emphasizing instead their wild uncivilized nature and the stupidity of their resistance. Life followed an opposite path, more seriously criticizing the hypocrisy and atrocities of U.S. involvement in the Philippines. Nevertheless, the use of similar imagery remained constant, as evidenced by the magazines’ visualizations of the White Man’s Burden, and their portrayal of the Philippines and Filipinos as dogs and insects. While The Judge’s and Life’s differing messages polarized even further as U.S. involvement in the Philippines continued, their use of similar imagery stays constant throughout the war. This paper analyzes the methods that these periodicals used to convey their different messages and follows the theme of similar imagery through the course of the war.
Some political cartoons from Life:
This is the first image I mentioned in class, directly juxtaposing American revolutionaries with Philippine resistance fighters.
Turning now to some political cartoons from the Judge:
At the end of the 19th century, the U.S. made its bid to become one of the great powers of the world. Amid growing tensions between the pro- and anti-imperialist forces, cartoonists for weekly journals began to take sides, creating images designed to influence public opinion. Founded in 1881, The Judge had become an organ for Republican pro-imperialist propaganda under William Arkell’s leadership.[1] Anti-imperialists found support in Life, which, despite its more social focus, took a strong stand on the question of Philippine annexation and on the morality of the subsequent war.[2] Before the outbreak of the Philippine-American War, The Judge portrayed Filipinos as needing the benevolent protection of the U.S. and rejoicing in their new liberty. Meanwhile, Life printed cartoons emphasizing the hypocrisy of the supposedly humanitarian motives for invading Cuba and the Philippines. Despite their differing stances, however, they both portrayed the Philippines as an attractive feminine identity, and used similar visual progressions to predict the effect of U.S. expansion. However, in the months and years following the outbreak of hostilities, The Judge turned sharply away from any sympathetic conception of the natives, emphasizing instead their wild uncivilized nature and the stupidity of their resistance. Life followed an opposite path, more seriously criticizing the hypocrisy and atrocities of U.S. involvement in the Philippines. Nevertheless, the use of similar imagery remained constant, as evidenced by the magazines’ visualizations of the White Man’s Burden, and their portrayal of the Philippines and Filipinos as dogs and insects. While The Judge’s and Life’s differing messages polarized even further as U.S. involvement in the Philippines continued, their use of similar imagery stays constant throughout the war. This paper analyzes the methods that these periodicals used to convey their different messages and follows the theme of similar imagery through the course of the war.
[1] Paul Somers Jr., Editorial Cartooning and Caricature: A Reference Guide (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998), 11.
[2] Stephen Hess and Milton Kaplan, The Ungentlemanly Art: A History of American Political Cartoons (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1968), 112.
Some political cartoons from Life:
This is the first image I mentioned in class, directly juxtaposing American revolutionaries with Philippine resistance fighters.
Turning now to some political cartoons from the Judge:
Saturday, February 26, 2011
Post-secular Development in Indonesia
Yesterday The Immanent Frame posted an article that might be of interest to those of you who research the intersection of religion and economics as well as to those of you who liked Pemberton’s book and want to know more about what is happening in post-New Order Java. The article is called “Post-secular development” and it is written by Daromir Rudnyckyj, author of Spiritual Economies: Islam, Globalization, and the Afterlife of Development (2010). Throughout the article, Rudnyckyj highlightes the processes by which faith has recently become the goal of development in Indonesia, thanks largely to a business-training program called ESQ.
To sum up the article, Rudnyckyj first tells of how he conducted his fieldwork in Indonesia from 2003-2005, focusing on the business practices of Krakatau Steel, a state-owned company that was a focal point in the nationalist project of modernization during Soeharto’s (here Suharto’s) regime. But now, after the 1998 Asian financial crisis and Suharto’s fall, Krakatau Steel is no longer “a symbol of modernization, development, and industrialization,” says Rudnyckyj. What once constituted its social mission (misi sosial)—particularly the creation of jobs and the elevation of living standards—has taken a backseat to its business mission, i.e., the desire for profits.
Employees recognize this fact, and worker motivation was at an all-time low until Krakatau Steel contracted a Jakarta-based company, the ESQ Leadership Center, to implement Emotional and Spiritual Quotient training. This type of training, says Rudnyckyj, lifts strategies from life-coaching programs like “The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People,” but most centrally, it (re)imagines the five pillars of Islam as lessons for business success. It has been extremely popular and widespread throughout the country, and recently it officially became a national movement with offices in 30 out of 33 Indonesian provinces.
It is worth quoting part of Rudnyckyj’s conclusion, in which he says:
During the New Order, development was the raison d’être of government policy and practice. However, after Suharto’s spectacular collapse, the logic of enhancement and growth that underlay the project of modernization was applied to the religious practices of industrial employees who were supposed to be the purveyors of development. Islamic practice, previously relegated to the background in Indonesia, was seen both as a means to revive economic growth and as something to be developed and enhanced.
ESQ has, in other words, made workers rethink their personal stake in state development by having profits signal their own triumphs in developing faith. This tactic is not unique to businesses in Indonesia, to be sure, but KS does seem to be a really fascinating case and a sukses story in its own right.
Mostly I just wanted to share the article in light of our discussion of Marx last Tuesday, but I’m interested to hear what people think about Rudnyckyj’s findings (and the strategies of the ESQ in general) as they relate to issues that we have discussed in class, or in light of your own knowledge about religion, politics, and economics in contemporary Indonesia.
Tuesday, February 22, 2011
two things
Hi all,
Two points of interest that might be relevant to today's class:
1) Alongside Pietz, another great source concerning "fetishism", its history, etymology, critique etc. from a non-anthropological perspective is F. Max Muller's 1878 lecture "Is Fetishism a Primitive Form of Religion?" which is available on Google Books here and in a newer version here.
2) It occurred to me during class that today's article by Stanely Fish on Watson the computer could have come straight from Rousseau, p. 44: "In any animal I see nothing but an ingenious machine to which nature has given sense in order for it to renew its strength and to protect itself, to a certain point, from all that tends to destroy or disturb it. I am aware of precisely the same things in the human machine, with the difference that nature alone does everything in the operations of an animal, whereas man contributes, as a free agent, to his own operations. The former chooses or rejects by instinct and the later by an act of freedom. Hence an animal cannot deviate from the rule that is prescribed to it, even when it would be advantageous to do so, while man deviates from it, often to his own detriment."
Just an interesting parallel, thought I'd share.
Two points of interest that might be relevant to today's class:
1) Alongside Pietz, another great source concerning "fetishism", its history, etymology, critique etc. from a non-anthropological perspective is F. Max Muller's 1878 lecture "Is Fetishism a Primitive Form of Religion?" which is available on Google Books here and in a newer version here.
2) It occurred to me during class that today's article by Stanely Fish on Watson the computer could have come straight from Rousseau, p. 44: "In any animal I see nothing but an ingenious machine to which nature has given sense in order for it to renew its strength and to protect itself, to a certain point, from all that tends to destroy or disturb it. I am aware of precisely the same things in the human machine, with the difference that nature alone does everything in the operations of an animal, whereas man contributes, as a free agent, to his own operations. The former chooses or rejects by instinct and the later by an act of freedom. Hence an animal cannot deviate from the rule that is prescribed to it, even when it would be advantageous to do so, while man deviates from it, often to his own detriment."
Just an interesting parallel, thought I'd share.
Saturday, February 12, 2011
Class #2: Cultural Patterns [Mead and Benedict]
During class on Tuesday, we discussed the importance of Mead and Benedict and the "culture and personality school," wherein we can think of culture as the individual personality writ large. Both were students of Boas and Benedict's thinking was also highly influenced by Sapir. Can we see the roots of their thinking in Boas' work? As we read the week earlier, Boas was drawn to the emotional and mental life, to poetry, to the roots of what makes people individuals (and by extension, how they convey and express themselves). Yet he largely discredited the emerging school of psychoanalysis as an inherently ethnocentric phenomenon arising out of a specific class and psyche (that was not an appropriate framework or lens for the people he worked with).
Benedict was highly influenced by her communications with Edward Sapir, known for his desire for an epistemology for the human sciences that was not a search for "laws" and generalizations but was true to the individual, the concrete and the experiential aspects of peoples. Therefore, Benedict and also Mead were concerned with how the individual became a representative of the social whole... yet there was also an equally important focus on interiority that was emerging.
Yet it is important to remember that Mead and Benedict were a product of their time and their place--1920s New York City @ Columbia, largely influenced by Jews fleeing Germany who brought with them an interest and fashion for psychoanalysis.
We also differentiated the American school from the Durkheimian model of the individual/society. For the Durkheim school, the individual was what was left over that was not society (essentially a negation) vs. the American "rugged individualism" and difference via deviance. For Mead and Benedict, the individual must differ from the social group by rejecting it. Innate to Mead and Benedict is the idea of malleability/plasticity (or that human nature is infinitely moldable, that it can be changed).
Both Mead and Benedict sought to understand culture (as a whole) as parts of the "arc of all human potentialities. Benedict sought to find these cultural patterns in so-called "simple" societies... or those that were outside of "Western" influences (i.e. the Zuni and other Native Americans). When she talks about the primitive, therefore, she is referring to a particular "purity." Again, both her work and Mead's is based on an implicit comparison (that we can see in the discipline reaching far back, per the Margaret Hodgen). This emphasis on comparison makes reading Benedict and Mead seem a little dated for us.
Finally, we discussed how Benedict's notion of culture is very much an aesthetic one (culture is like a poem). She argues that some cultures are more coherent than others--i.e., that they are coherent in terms of individual's commitments to particular parts of an arc or particular themes).
Benedict was highly influenced by her communications with Edward Sapir, known for his desire for an epistemology for the human sciences that was not a search for "laws" and generalizations but was true to the individual, the concrete and the experiential aspects of peoples. Therefore, Benedict and also Mead were concerned with how the individual became a representative of the social whole... yet there was also an equally important focus on interiority that was emerging.
Yet it is important to remember that Mead and Benedict were a product of their time and their place--1920s New York City @ Columbia, largely influenced by Jews fleeing Germany who brought with them an interest and fashion for psychoanalysis.
We also differentiated the American school from the Durkheimian model of the individual/society. For the Durkheim school, the individual was what was left over that was not society (essentially a negation) vs. the American "rugged individualism" and difference via deviance. For Mead and Benedict, the individual must differ from the social group by rejecting it. Innate to Mead and Benedict is the idea of malleability/plasticity (or that human nature is infinitely moldable, that it can be changed).
Both Mead and Benedict sought to understand culture (as a whole) as parts of the "arc of all human potentialities. Benedict sought to find these cultural patterns in so-called "simple" societies... or those that were outside of "Western" influences (i.e. the Zuni and other Native Americans). When she talks about the primitive, therefore, she is referring to a particular "purity." Again, both her work and Mead's is based on an implicit comparison (that we can see in the discipline reaching far back, per the Margaret Hodgen). This emphasis on comparison makes reading Benedict and Mead seem a little dated for us.
Finally, we discussed how Benedict's notion of culture is very much an aesthetic one (culture is like a poem). She argues that some cultures are more coherent than others--i.e., that they are coherent in terms of individual's commitments to particular parts of an arc or particular themes).
Friday, February 11, 2011
Anthropology and Science
Ever since we touched on issues of anthropological methodology one or two classes ago, I have been thinking about the relationship between anthropology and science, and the relationship between the two. I'm particularly interested in hearing other points of view on this one.
A good brief article which covers the decision of the American Anthropological Association to remove the word science from its long-range plan statement, as well as the reaction to it, can be found at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/science/10anthropology.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=%22anthropology%20a%20science%22&st=cse (I found the image of the cat going around clawing up all the furniture particularly amusing.)
To restate my position from class, while I think that anthropology is not as falsifiable in the Popperian sense as the physical sciences, anthropology does use many scientific epistemologies: observation, hypothesis testing, quatitative/statistical analyses, even (in archaeological anthropology at least) experimentation. The systematic removal of the word science from the AAA's long-range plans seems to be an attempt to distance itself from these methods which, as a whole, form a central piece of anthropological methodology. I prefer to think of anthropology not as a science but as a consumer of the scientific method.
What do you think?
--Nat
A good brief article which covers the decision of the American Anthropological Association to remove the word science from its long-range plan statement, as well as the reaction to it, can be found at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/science/10anthropology.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=%22anthropology%20a%20science%22&st=cse (I found the image of the cat going around clawing up all the furniture particularly amusing.)
To restate my position from class, while I think that anthropology is not as falsifiable in the Popperian sense as the physical sciences, anthropology does use many scientific epistemologies: observation, hypothesis testing, quatitative/statistical analyses, even (in archaeological anthropology at least) experimentation. The systematic removal of the word science from the AAA's long-range plans seems to be an attempt to distance itself from these methods which, as a whole, form a central piece of anthropological methodology. I prefer to think of anthropology not as a science but as a consumer of the scientific method.
What do you think?
--Nat
Wednesday, February 9, 2011
Anthropology and "The Arab Mind"
Ian and Jasmine both touch on instances of a (many way) traffic in psychologizing (and pathologizing) cultural stereotypes of Arabs and of specific Arab national cultures. The impulses underlying the action of circulating such stereotypes can vary widely, from the cynical opportunism (Mubarak), to what our own Michael Herzfeld calls "cultural intimacy," namely in-group solidarity-making (Jasmine's relatives).
Certain anthropological "culture and personality" studies on the model established by Ruth Benedict have played their own role in consolidating and relaying such stereotypes. The case one particular book, Raphael Petit's The Arab Mind, comes to mind. The 1973 book was reprinted in 2002 and was widely and uncritically used as source material by counterinsurgency strategists with the U.S. army in Iraq. In a column printed some years ago in Anthropology News, Gregory Starrett assesses the book as well as the possibility that it contributed to the armed forces' mistreatment of Iraqis on an everyday level as well as in such sensational affairs as Abu Ghraib.
http://www.aaanet.org/press/an/infocus/viewsonhumans/starrett.htm
Certain anthropological "culture and personality" studies on the model established by Ruth Benedict have played their own role in consolidating and relaying such stereotypes. The case one particular book, Raphael Petit's The Arab Mind, comes to mind. The 1973 book was reprinted in 2002 and was widely and uncritically used as source material by counterinsurgency strategists with the U.S. army in Iraq. In a column printed some years ago in Anthropology News, Gregory Starrett assesses the book as well as the possibility that it contributed to the armed forces' mistreatment of Iraqis on an everyday level as well as in such sensational affairs as Abu Ghraib.
http://www.aaanet.org/press/an/infocus/viewsonhumans/starrett.htm
Tuesday, February 8, 2011
Cultural "expertise"
Ian's post on Egypt made me think about the continuing echoes of ideas we saw in "Patterns of Culture". I'm especially interested in how legal systems give weight to conceptions of culture-- consider for example this story reported in the Israeli news in 2004, "Court Erupts Over Expert's Testimony on 'Arab Mentality'":
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/court-erupts-over-expert-s-testimony-on-arab-mentality-1.144943
In this case, a Middle East studies professor serving as an expert witness for the prosecution during a trial described the "Arab mentality", which he explained is characterized by a victim mentality and low standards of cleanliness (as evidence, he noted that "Arab" villages are "dirtier", apparently with little discussion of whether this could be due to economic inequalities and discrimination in the provision of state services...) My Palestinian relatives (especially my very tidy aunts!) would reject this description of the Arab mentality, but I wonder if they would dispute the very existence of an "Arab mentality" at all - would they defend its existence, but just define it differently (e.g. saying it tends to include a love for children, elaborate poetry and syrupy desserts?) Or would they reframe so-called cultural characteristics as merely a rational response to a particular political environment (e.g. is it irrational conspiracy thinking to speculate that the CIA might be involved in certain events when it does in fact have a notorious track record of involvement in coups, assassination attempts, etc.) Questions for my next family reunion...
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/court-erupts-over-expert-s-testimony-on-arab-mentality-1.144943
In this case, a Middle East studies professor serving as an expert witness for the prosecution during a trial described the "Arab mentality", which he explained is characterized by a victim mentality and low standards of cleanliness (as evidence, he noted that "Arab" villages are "dirtier", apparently with little discussion of whether this could be due to economic inequalities and discrimination in the provision of state services...) My Palestinian relatives (especially my very tidy aunts!) would reject this description of the Arab mentality, but I wonder if they would dispute the very existence of an "Arab mentality" at all - would they defend its existence, but just define it differently (e.g. saying it tends to include a love for children, elaborate poetry and syrupy desserts?) Or would they reframe so-called cultural characteristics as merely a rational response to a particular political environment (e.g. is it irrational conspiracy thinking to speculate that the CIA might be involved in certain events when it does in fact have a notorious track record of involvement in coups, assassination attempts, etc.) Questions for my next family reunion...
Saturday, February 5, 2011
Mubarak and knowing culture
Here's a story that was picked up by a few papers the other day:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/04/mubarak-stands-fast
"Mubarak, in the first major interview since the protests began, expressed no sense of betrayal over President Barack Obama's call on Tuesday for him to begin the transition to democracy "now". But there was a hint of resentment when he said Obama did not understand Egyptian culture and the trouble that would ensue if he left office immediately.
-Ian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/04/mubarak-stands-fast
"Mubarak, in the first major interview since the protests began, expressed no sense of betrayal over President Barack Obama's call on Tuesday for him to begin the transition to democracy "now". But there was a hint of resentment when he said Obama did not understand Egyptian culture and the trouble that would ensue if he left office immediately.
"I am fed up. After 62 years in public service, I have had enough. I want to go," Mubarak said in an interview with ABC's Christiane Amanpour. "If I resign today, there will be chaos."
--I wonder if these remarks could be seen as an instance of power/knowledge at work in cultural rhetoric. The members of Egyptian culture here are like automatons with no freedom of movement: they will descend into chaos because that is what their culture dictates. In stating his knowledge of this fact Mubarak (unlike Obama) locates himself in the unique position of individual agency and control over its force.-Ian
Thursday, February 3, 2011
Class #2 (Feb 1)
Here I will outline five clusters of questions from our discussion on Tuesday. Please forgive me if I left out anything.
(1) We reflected on the terms “human nature” and “cultures” as found in Boas. On one hand, Boas presents culture in the plural as opposed to a singular culture that varies in degree or quantity. On the other hand, in his final sentence of the Eskmos article, he writes:
…although the character of their life is so rude as compared to civilized life, the Eskimo is a man as we are; that his feelings, his virtues, and his shortcoming are based in human nature, like ours. [55]
What are we to make of “human nature” or the phrase “a man as we are”? How do we understand Boas’ attention to both particularity and universality? Are they in tension, mutually reinforcing, or necessarily paired?
(2) Related to the previous question, we discussed the practice of organizing data with categories. By utilizing general terms to aggregate particularities, do we have a common understanding of “what culture is” or “cultural forms”? What makes a spear a spear? With what criteria are we to know whether “two things” belong to the same type?
(4) Another set of questions revolves around the term “integration.” In Boas’ “The Aims of Anthropological Research”, he writes:
Every attempt to deduce cultural forms from a single cause is doomed to failure, for the various expressions of culture are closely interrelated and one cannot be altered without having an effect upon all the others. Culture is integrated. [256]
If culture is integrated, how do we study it? Is it possible to study culture without including every component that makes up culture?
(5) In Elliot’s “The Three Senses of ‘Culture’”, he introduces the possibility of “cultural disintegration”:
Cultural disintegration is present when two or more strata so separate that these become in effect distinct cultures; and also when culture at the upper group level breaks into fragments each of which represents one cultural activity alone. [26]
Do we agree that cultural disintegration is possible? If so, what does it look like and how does it occur? How can we put together Boas’ cultural “integration” and Elliot’s cultural “disintegration”? Do Boas and Elliot use these terms in comparable ways? How do their notions of culture influence this distinction? Is culture something that “must be made” or “simply exists”?
Saturday, January 29, 2011
Between Poetry and Science
As promised, this first substantive (if brief) blog post will simply try to record a question that emerged during the introductory class meeting for "Culture":
Within anthropology, how has the relationship between the projects of representing culture and understanding culture been understood at different points of time? How much weight has been given to one over the other? Does the answer to this question vary across the American, British, or Continental traditions? Here representing culture refers to the production of a portrait of a society and its members, whether in the form of description and personal narrative in the voice of ethnographer or via the inclusion of poetry, narrative, folklore, or spoken discourse from native informants. Understanding culture refers to the discovery and explanation of some aspect or other of social life via the development of interpretive or explanatory hypotheses and their subsequent validation or falsification.
Thanks to Charlie for raising this question, which seems to me to get at one of the constitutive tensions that animates anthropology as a discipline poised between the humanities and the social sciences. Of course, this was just one of several interesting contributions that were made at our first meeting. To those of you whose recollections are still fresh: please consider taking a few moments to post them here.
Within anthropology, how has the relationship between the projects of representing culture and understanding culture been understood at different points of time? How much weight has been given to one over the other? Does the answer to this question vary across the American, British, or Continental traditions? Here representing culture refers to the production of a portrait of a society and its members, whether in the form of description and personal narrative in the voice of ethnographer or via the inclusion of poetry, narrative, folklore, or spoken discourse from native informants. Understanding culture refers to the discovery and explanation of some aspect or other of social life via the development of interpretive or explanatory hypotheses and their subsequent validation or falsification.
Thanks to Charlie for raising this question, which seems to me to get at one of the constitutive tensions that animates anthropology as a discipline poised between the humanities and the social sciences. Of course, this was just one of several interesting contributions that were made at our first meeting. To those of you whose recollections are still fresh: please consider taking a few moments to post them here.
Wednesday, January 26, 2011
Welcome
Hello all. As Mary and I mentioned during yesterday's first class meeting, this is a place to preserve and extend threads of class discussion as well as to share relevant resources with each other. Please be sure to include your name in every post, whether in the title or at the end of your text. Thanks!
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